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’Golpes, “golpes inteligentes” e eleições: 
Estratégias de poder direitas num contexto 
de hegemonia de esquerda’.
Resumo 
A maioria das análises das estratégias de poder 
de direita na América Latina destacam a relativa 
escassez de partidos políticos de direita dedicados 
e a preponderância de estratégias não-eleitorais. 
Apesar disso, tais estudos continuam a privilegiar 
o eleitoral em detrimento de outras estratégias. 
Este artigo apresenta uma perspectiva mais 
abrangente baseada em sociologia política e 
teorias de psicologia política. Aqui, as estratégias 
são categorizadas em três níveis - eleitoral, extra-
eleitoral e semi- ou extra-constitucional - que pode 
ser ativado de várias maneiras, dependendo do nível 
de ameaça percebida aos objetivos do Direito e às 
condições no terreno. Além disso, em casos de grande 
ameaça, o ideal é conseguir um “golpe inteligente”, 
pelo qual os governos de esquerda são forçados 
a sair do cargo com um elemento de legitimidade 
popular e institucional. Deste modo, a Direita Latino-
Americana tem como objetivo integrar as estratégias 
eleitorais e não-eleitorais ao contexto democrático 
da hegemonia de esquerda na região
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Abstract
Most analyses of Right-wing power strategies 
in Latin America highlight the relative paucity 
of dedicated Right-wing political parties, and 
the preponderance of non-electoral strategies. 
Despite this such studies continue to privilege 
the electoral over other strategies. This paper 
presents a more wide-ranging, comprehensive 
perspective based on political sociology and 
political psychology theories. Here strategies are 
categorised at three levels – electoral, extra-
electoral and semi- or extra-constitutional - which 
can be activated in a multi-layered manner, 
depending on the level of threat perceived 
to Right objectives and on conditions on the 
ground. Using the case study of the removal of 
Dilma Rousseff from the presidency in Brazil in 
2016, the article seeks to illustrate the ultimate 
aim of achieving a “smart coup”, whereby left 
governments are forced out of office with 
relatively little bloodshed and an element of 
popular and institutional legitimacy. In this 
way the Latin American Right aims to integrate 
electoral and non-electoral strategies to the 
democratic context of Left hegemony in the 
region. 
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Introduction
What and who are the Latin American Right, and what is their role in and impact on 
politics in the region? In this article I argue that traditional political science accounts of 
the phenomenon, with their emphasis on political parties and institutions, fail to grasp 
the multi-faceted nature of the Right in the region, with its context of vertiginous 
inequality. Instead I offer a more complex, layered and comprehensive view of the 
Latin American Right, composed of the following elements. 
First, I identify, following Bobbio (1996), the central role of inequality, particularly 
class inequalities, in Left/Right differentiation. Second, I advance Michael Mann’s 
concept of social power as an alternative framework, with its focus on power networks 
in the economic, ideological, political, military and transnational arenas. Third, I 
illustrate the key position of neoliberalism in Latin American Right discourse and policy. 
Moreover, I argue that the ultimate aim of such ideological preferences is to form what 
I call right-oriented state/society complexes, in which neoliberal forms of governance 
are embedded into Latin American power structures at the national, regional and 
transnational level. Ultimately, the “full spectrum” stability of such governance makes 
it much more difficult for ideological alternatives to prosper, as it is supported not just 
by state actors, but those at the sub-state and supra-state level too.  
Fourth, I also argue that the success of this project has been fundamentally 
threatened by post-neoliberal, ‘pink tide’ governments in each of the power networks, 
provoking a multi-level strategic response from the Right. This has three inter-
linked and complementary levels: the institutional, taking in parties, elections and 
institutions; mobilisational, involving not only popular mobilisations, but also elite 
‘structural’ and ‘instrumental’ power (Fairfield 2015) especially in the economy and in 
the media, respectively; and, semi- or extra-constitutional, building on the previous 
strategies but aimed at a more immediate removal of a sitting Left president. I offer 
Brazil as a case study to illustrate the operation of these strategies. Overall I argue that 
the Latin American Right is a multi-faceted phenomenon, which reacts to the threat 
of the Left to elite interests, and presents a wide variety of strategic responses to this 
threat, with an ultimate aim to embed neoliberal governance at the national, regional 
and transnational levels. In this way, the analysis, unlike many previously, incorporates 
actors at levels above and below the state, as well as at the level of the state itself in a 
more systematic fashion.
The Right in theory
How can we define the Left/Right cleavage? First, following Bobbio (1996), issues 
of inequality are essential to its definition, both over time and across space; policy 
solutions may change but this central concern is constant.  Second, this concern with 
inequality also has profound class consequences: policies associated with the Left 
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can involve more state intervention to lessen inequalities, while those on the Right 
seek to lessen state intervention with regard to inequalities, but to increase it with 
regard to ensuring market dominance. Each policy option has implicit and explicit 
outcomes favouring some classes over others, and hence class and, in particular, the 
role of elites should be central to any discussion of the Right. Third, such debates do 
not remain within State boundaries, but also structure international and global policy 
making, giving such debates an important transnational aspect (Noel and Thérien 
2008; Silva 2009). Finally, the Left/Right debate takes place within a wider and never-
ending struggle for hegemony between these fundamental worldviews. While certain 
consensuses may emerge at particular times, these are rarely fixed and can and will be 
challenged.
In light of this discussion the core meaning of the Left/Right distinction can be 
conceived as “whether one supports or opposes social change in an egalitarian 
direction” (Ronald Inglehart cited in Noël and Thérien 2008, 10). As neoliberalism is 
recognised by many as leading to increased socio-economic inequality (Harvey 2005; 
Stiglitz 2012; Piketty, 2014), it can be argued that those who support and actively 
promote neoliberalism are on the Right of the political spectrum while those who 
oppose them, or at least question them, are to the Left. There is also, it must be noted, 
an important social conservative aspect to Right wing discourse which itself has an 
anti-egalitarian thrust. Yet this rarely disturbs, and often complements, the centrality 
of neoliberalism to the Right’s overall project. The Right then, in the current historical 
context, is a class-based, elite-led project with neoliberalism as its ideological core. 
The Right in Latin America
Chalmers et al. (1992) briefly trace the history of the Right in 20th century Latin 
America and note that political parties were not prominent in its political expressions 
throughout that century. During the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) period, 
from the 1930’s to the 1960’s, many segments of the Right had ‘personal, bureaucratic, 
and clientelistic ties’ to state power (Chalmers et al.1992, 4)  which obviated the need for 
Right political parties in most of the region. However, these national-populist regimes 
betrayed their rightist allies, by supporting and encouraging ‘populist, participative 
corporatism’ (Chalmers et al.1992, 4) which threatened elite dominance in favour of 
popular sectors, particularly as the global crises of the Keynesian model and its Latin 
American, ISI equivalent began to take hold. 
As O’ Donnell (1978) shows, the sense of threat felt by elites in the face of popular 
empowerment in the ISI period, led the former groups to turn to the military for 
support in the 1970s and early 1980s, drawing together an ‘alliance of technocrats, the 
military and state-linked businesses’ (Chalmers et al. 1992, 4) to rule the state through 
‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ (O’ Donnell 1978). This arrangement, however, turned 
out to be spectacularly unsuccessful, at least in political terms, for a number of reasons, 
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including the unreliability of the military as an ally, especially due to the many human 
rights abuses committed by them during this period and, above all, the end of the Cold 
War and the eventual disappearance of the threat of the revolutionary Left. Therefore, 
as the 1980s progressed, sectors of the Right began to embrace democracy and 
indeed played a ‘crucial role, if not dominated, transitions to democracy’ in this period 
(Chalmers et al. 1992, 3). This position also allowed the Right to redefine democracy 
in the liberal sense of competitive democratic institutions, while the equalising, 
substantive elements of democracy were muted (Chalmers et al. 1992, 5). Right-wing 
sectors loosened their previous close ties to the state, in favour of a new emphasis on 
parties, legislatures and elections (Chalmers et al. 1992, 7), and a separation between 
state, society and church. The aim, then, was to create a Lockean ‘night-watchman 
state’ although this was not always achieved in practice (Chalmers et al. 1992, 9). 
The Latin American Right then goes far beyond political parties in this account. 
Traditionally the authors maintain, the main actors on the Right were Church 
hierarchies, the military and socio-economic elites (Chalmers et al. 1992, 7), and as 
neoliberalism develops there is an increasing role for the private media, and ‘large 
firms and powerful think tanks’ (Boron 1992, 69) with a distancing between the military 
and the state. The new ‘core constituency’ then of the Latin American Right – that is 
‘those actors of society that are most important to its political agenda and resources’ 
(Gibson 1992, 15) - are those groups who support the free market and a lessening of 
state power over market relations. 
Therefore, it is not political parties which dominate the Right in Latin America, but 
rather the paramount expressions of economic (business groups), ideological (Church, 
media, think tanks etc.), and military power. It is these which condition political power, 
without negating the possibility that political power can also shape and condition 
these areas of power in turn. In effect, there is no hierarchy between these different 
sectors of power; indeed, if anything elites seek harmony between all four of them in 
favour of the supremacy of their own social power. The problem for the Right then is 
not how to transform the traditional relationships between these areas of power and 
the State ‘into institutionalised and responsible representation’ as Chalmers et al. (1992, 
4) maintain, but rather how this can be done without allowing elite domination in all 
four areas to be threatened. Hence, the aim is achieving stable regimes of governance, 
which nonetheless, do not threaten, but rather enhance elite dominance and the 
liberal economic and political models which they support. 
Yet, this broader vision of the Latin American Right, in this and most other 
treatments of the subject matter (Middlebrook 2000; Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014) 
is muted in favour of an analytical accent which remains invariably on the subsidiarity 
of these other areas of power to state power. Indeed, often they are not recognised 
as distinct areas of power in their own right, but rather as simply sectional interests 
which jostle for recognition with other such interests, such as labour, to have access to 
state power. Yet this underestimates the overwhelming weight of elite dominance in 
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these areas of power and its ability to override political power and reorient it to an elite 
worldview. The literature on the Latin American Right then is dominated by a liberal, 
institutionalist, pluralist perspective, which is insufficiently equipped to analyse the 
complexities which the vertiginous asymmetries of power present in the region. 
The issue of power then should be central to any analysis, as these elites possess 
greater social power than any other group in Latin American societies. 
Mann, Social Power and the Latin American Right
Here I contend that Michael Mann’s concept of social power provides a broader 
framework from which to view these different arenas. For Mann, power operates 
through ‘multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks’ (Mann, 1986, 
13), within a specifically identified territory. These networks of power reflect the four 
sources of social power in any given social formation - ideological, economic, military, 
and political –none of which has primacy as and of itself, but which can develop such 
primacy at distinct moments in history in different societies, depending on the context 
found. 
Mann defines each power network as Weberian ‘ideal types’ with their particular 
organisational forms. Ideological power then is ‘when meaning, norms and aesthetic 
and ritual practices are monopolized by a distinctive group [which must be] highly 
plausible in the conditions of the time’ (Mann 1986, 23). Economic power ‘derives from 
the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organisation of the extraction, 
transformation, distribution, and consumption of the objects of nature’ (Mann 1986, 
23). This process causes the formation of social classes, with the dominant class 
monopolising control over these processes (Mann 1986, 23). Military power ‘derives 
from the necessity of organised physical defence and its usefulness for aggression’ 
(Mann 1986, 26). Ideally, in democracies, military power should be subservient to 
political power, but this is not always the case as Latin America’s history of military 
regimes amply demonstrates. 
Political power ‘derives from the usefulness of centralised, institutionalised, 
territorialised regulation on many aspects of social relations’ in other words ‘state 
power’ (Mann 1986, 23). Political power can take despotic or infrastructural forms, the 
first when elites ‘take decisions without negotiation with groups in civil society’ (Mann, 
2002, 2); the second when states ‘possess infrastructures penetrating universally 
throughout civil society, through which political elites can extract resources from, and 
provide services to all its subjects’ (Mann, 2002, 2). In most advanced democracies, 
state power is despotically weak but infrastructurally strong, that is that states have 
high levels of command over each network of power, but that this command rests on 
equally high levels of popular legitimacy, usually achieved through political parties. 
It also has a strong transnational element, usually organised along imperial or multi-
state lines (Mann, 1986, 27). As Silva (2009) points out, this factor has important 
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consequences for Latin America in particular due to the region’s high dependence on 
international financial institutions, foreign investment, international markets and the 
influence of the United States. 
The central issue for Latin American states to develop democratically then is, 
according to Mann (2002), the lessening of inequalities, which in turn requires the 
reduction of oligarchical power with an increase in state power. Yet, here I argue 
that Latin American elites possess sufficient collective power across each of the four 
power networks to successfully resist any move towards greater social equalisation, 
which would by necessity involve a lessening of their own power. Moreover, Fairfield 
(2015) shows that neoliberalism has increased rather than lessened the business elite’s 
structural and instrumental power, using it to reinforce that ideology, both nationally 
and transnationally, across each of the power networks. Hence, neoliberalism is central 
to the maintenance and extension of elite power in the current historical conjuncture, 
a fact recognised both in Right-wing discourse and in Right-wing policy performance. 
Right-Wing Neoliberal Discourses and Practice in Latin 
America
Cannon (2016) finds that among Right or liberal-leaning civil society groups and 
political parties in four countries in South America – Argentina, Chile, Colombia and 
Venezuela – there is a still firm adherence to neoliberal market-based principles with, 
however, a more nuanced appreciation for the need for poverty alleviation. In terms 
of state/market relations there is a firm consensus around the subsidiarity of the state 
to the market. State intervention in the economy – and indeed society - must be kept 
to a minimum, if it should exist at all; indeed the state should regard the economy as 
the preserve of the private sector and ensure its continuance. Basic public services – 
primarily health and education – should be provided for the poor, but these services 
do not necessarily need to be provided by the state. Nor is the aim to lessen socio-
economic inequality, but rather to facilitate individual participation in the market, with 
employment, in the private sector preferably, seen as the main goal. This viewpoint 
hence is in line with orthodox neoliberal policies as promulgated by international 
financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, as well as mainstream 
political thinking in Europe and the United States (Silva 2009, 39). 
Views on inequalities of class, race or gender are for the most part unacknowledged 
by subjects in all four countries, with instead an emphasis on the individual, who with 
the right guidance, support and personal effort and regardless of race, class or gender, 
can participate in national life and achieve success to any level. Women may ‘choose’ 
not to participate in the market in order to devote time to family, and this is sometimes 
ascribed to her essential nature, as innately caring and nurturing and not simply to 
her individual choice. It is to be noted, however, that such gender stereotypes are 
not generalised as in Argentina and Chile, in particular, there is a general acceptance 
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on the need for action to improve gender equality in the workplace. Nevertheless, 
policy solutions offered are primarily market based, voluntary and rarely accept 
state intervention. Meanwhile, education, especially in Argentina, is identified as key 
to ensure that a supposed innate entrepreneurialism predominates in the popular 
imagination. 
Hence, despite some differences around levels of state provision, discourse among 
Right-leaning and liberal actors, in politics, civil society and in business, across these 
four countries reflects a remarkably coherent view of the type of society required 
in Latin America; one based on neoliberal, market-based tenets in which resulting 
inequalities are of scant concern. These findings are similar to those found by Reis 
(2011) in her study of Brazilian elite attitudes on the same issues, providing further 
evidence of their prevalence among elites in the region.  
Furthermore, on examining policy options in four Latin American countries 
which are most dominated by neoliberalism in the current context – Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru – we find such beliefs transformed faithfully into policy. Despite 
Left-led governments in two of these countries (at the time of writing Chile and Peru), 
neoliberalism is so deeply embedded in national power networks that alternative 
policy options are extremely difficult to implement without fierce elite resistance. 
Economically, these countries are characterised by little state controlled enterprise 
and low levels of market controlling state intervention, and with high levels of market 
freedom, corporatisation and transnationalisation of business ownership structures. 
They also have highly open trading regimes, with a large number of free trade 
agreements (FTAs), most commonly with the US. FTA’s are particularly important as 
they usually contain legal clauses which inhibit policy change liable to prejudice profit, 
regardless of its social or environmental benefits. Equally importantly, these rules are 
usually governed by courts outside national jurisdictions, often in the United States. 
Ideological regimes are controlled through highly concentrated and oligopolized 
media ownership structures which show heavy editorial biases in favour of 
maintaining and deepening the neoliberal status quo. Moreover, networks of liberal 
and right-wing think tanks, supporting and espousing neoliberal tenets, are found in 
each of these countries often established with financial support from transnational 
organisations. Political regimes show remarkable levels of ideological uniformity 
in favour of neoliberalism, and even when this is not the case, policy deviance from 
neoliberal tenets is highly controlled due to the embeddedness of neoliberalism in 
the other power networks. Militarily these regimes usually maintain alliances with the 
United States, cooperating with that country in the region, and sometimes, beyond, 
including facilitating US intervention under the banners of the so-called wars “on 
drugs” and “on terror”. As can be seen by this account, high levels of transnational 
influence traverse most of these power networks, mostly from the US but also from 
Europe, and increasingly from China. Moreover, the official establishment in 2012 of 
the transnational organisation Pacific Alliance (PA), grouping these neoliberalised 
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states together, with Costa Rica and Panama as future candidates for membership, 
suggests a longer term transnational project with the potential to homogenise this 
political economy model throughout the Latin American region.   
In each of these countries then neoliberalism has formidable collective power in 
the sense that neoliberal advocates have horizontal linkages across all of the power 
clusters examined here. The confluence of interests around neoliberalism between 
elites in each of these power clusters result in a narrowing of space for ideological 
alternatives to gain traction. Confluences of interests can also aggregate around social 
conservatism and law-and-order issues, but neoliberalism will usually be privileged. 
As stated, organisations such as the Pacific Alliance aims to further embed this model 
at the transnational level, linking it up to the key centres of neoliberalism in North 
America and Europe and then across to the economies of East Asia, as well as projecting 
itself as an alternative to existing regional groupings such as ALBA and Mercosur. 
Furthermore, with the accession of Chile to the OECD and with Colombia also on 
its way to becoming a member, such agreements will make it even more difficult to 
deviate from neoliberal tenets and opens up the possibility for their extension across 
the region. These regimes I therefore suggest are right-oriented state/society complexes 
due to the deep embeddedness of neoliberal governance at the sub-state, state and 
supra-state levels. This makes it extremely difficult for non-neoliberal alternatives to 
prosper, even if such alternatives appear, as was the case, for example, in Peru under 
Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) (Adrianzén 2014). 
Hence on a discourse and on a practice level, in the current historical context 
neoliberalism remains the main ideological project among the Right in many countries 
in the region, with a view to its eventual dominance throughout. Nevertheless, these 
tenets have been powerfully challenged since the beginning of the millennium, by 
post-neoliberal regimes seeking to control the excesses of the market and bring new 
forms of political participation into action.  
Right-wing prospects in Left-led Latin America
The Latin American region, and particularly South America, has been affected by 
the “pink tide” of Left-wing governments which swept through the region from the 
millennium onwards, presenting a considerable challenge to Right-wing, neoliberal 
hegemony. In four countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and, above all, Venezuela - 
Right hegemony has been challenged to an important degree in each of Mann’s five 
power clusters, with each government introducing unorthodox policies contradicting 
important neoliberal tenets around free markets and/or liberal democracy. Yet this 
challenge has also been felt in a number of other countries, especially in the regional 
powerhouse Brazil where there is evidence of a shift in hegemony in each of the five 
areas, although not to the same intensity as in the above-mentioned states. 
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Economically, it could be argued that the threat to Right-wing hegemony was at 
three levels in the region during the apogee of the ‘pink tide’. In the Bolivarian countries 
of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and also in Argentina under Nestor Kirchner and then his 
wife Cristina (2003-2015), it can be assessed as from medium to high. These countries 
are the only countries in the region with significant reversals of privatisation as well 
as introducing other measures which control, intervene in, or contradict the freedom 
of the market, including exchange controls (Venezuela, Argentina), interfering with 
the “autonomy” of the Central Bank, price controls, debt defaults (Argentina, Ecuador) 
and land-redistribution (Bolivia, Venezuela) among others (Flores-Macias 2010, 415-6). 
Even in the so-called “social democratic” Left-led countries of Brazil and Uruguay, 
privatisation has been stalled, and in Brazil state intervention in the economy 
remained high during the first presidency of the PT’s Dilma Rousseff (2010-2014). 
Hence while the greatest threat to the neoliberal project during the “pink tide” era is 
posed by Venezuela, followed by the other Bolivarian countries of Ecuador and Bolivia, 
there were also medium level threats in Argentina and even a low to medium threat in 
PT-led Brazil. 
Similar findings are evident when one looks at the other power networks 
examined here. In the political arena, for example, the Bolivarian countries particularly 
have been distancing themselves from liberal representative models towards more 
participative ones. These were accompanied by strengthened executives, reduced 
checks and balances and restrictions on civil and political liberties creating a climate 
of ‘class-based polarisation over the very meaning of democracy’ (Smilde 2014, 29). In 
terms of ideological power, many Left governments strengthened state broadcasters, 
including at the regional level with the launch of Telesur, a type of Al Jazeera for the 
Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region. A variety of laws have been introduced 
by the three Bolivarian governments, and Argentina, to attempt to limit concentration 
of ownership and increasing control on content. Community ownership of media has 
been especially encouraged in Venezuela, but also in Bolivia and to a lesser extent in 
Argentina. While there are questions over the effectiveness of these measures in terms 
of increased democratisation of the media (Doleac, 2015) the moves are sufficient 
to set off alarm bells among elites who most benefit from the existing ownership 
structures.  
Militarily, there are profound differences between the Bolivarian countries, 
other Left-led countries and neoliberalised countries, with the latter participating 
enthusiastically in US-led military initiatives, while the Bolivarian countries reduce or 
eliminate such cooperation and those in the middle remain neutral (Bitar 2013, 34-
35). And in terms of transnational power, Left-led countries have embarked on new 
regional initiatives such as UNASUR, CELAC or ALBA, as opposed to the US dominated 
OAS (Organisation of American States) and the regional, neoliberalised Pacific Alliance. 
In all these ways then, the Left has posed serious challenges to Right-elite hegemony 
in many countries in the region, disturbing preceding attempts to establish stable 
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structures of neoliberal governance, not just at the national level, but also at regional 
and hemispheric levels too. Right-wing elites, however, have not taken this situation 
lying down, and instead have developed multi-level strategies seeking the removal of 
the threat posed by these governments.  
Right-wing strategies in Left-led Latin America
Three levels of Right strategy can be identified in response to this situation of 
disturbed neoliberal hegemony by Left-led governments in the region: institutional, 
mobilisational, and semi- or extra-constitutional. The first strategy is largely contained 
within existing institutionality in the form of party and electoral activity; in the 
second, this can be complimented by popular demonstrations, investor strikes, media 
campaigns and a wide variety of mobilisational activities beyond the political power 
network and into all other networks including the transnational; and, in the third, semi- 
or extra-constitutional level strategic activity can be further extended to include the 
removal of the government, including with Armed Forces involvement but preferably 
in using semi-constitutional methods to ensure a smooth transition to a new Right-
oriented government, in what I call ‘smart coups’. These strategies, however, are not 
necessarily exclusive but rather can be complementary, emerging from the particular 
conjunctural dynamic. Their success is linked not just to the perception of threat felt by 
elites but also by the level of vulnerability of the democratic polity existing in a specific 
state. The higher the level of threat felt by elites and the higher the vulnerability of the 
polity, the more likely coups – ‘smart’ or otherwise - will occur, and even be successful. 
Overall, I suggest that this theoretical approach is more complete than previous, more 
traditional political science approaches, as it provides greater flexibility across time 
and space and greater comprehensiveness in its inclusion of a wider number of actors 
in a more systematised fashion. 
1. Institutional Strategies
In terms of institutional strategies, this first of all refers to the building of 
institutionalised parties. Luna and Rovira Kaltwassser (2011) find two types of Right 
political parties in the region. The first type, with emblematic examples such as the UDI 
(Unión Democráta Independiente/Independent Democrat Union) in Chile, are well 
organised, with a strong central hierarchy which nonetheless allows for decentralised 
territorial organisation and hence distinct types of electoral mobilisation. These parties 
can capture a combined popular support from both upper and lower social sectors, 
with frequent use of clientelism to support this. The second type of parties they identify, 
giving examples of the “U” party of ex-president Álvaro Uribe in Colombia and RN 
(Renovación Nacional/National Renovation) in Chile, are territorially centralised almost 
exclusively in the capital, with vertical decision-making structures. Election campaigns 
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are strongly centred on the candidate as a solution to a specific problem, such as 
Uribe’s “democratic security” position in Colombia as an answer to that country’s civil 
war.  While many of the parties in both camps have differing historical backgrounds all 
‘have a privileged link with business sectors, which coincides with their free-market 
positions’ (Luna and Rovira Kaltwassser 2011, 17). 
Further strategies are the ideological colonisation of parties which have been 
historically Left, Left-populist, Social Democratic, Christian Democratic and indeed 
conservative in their ideological orientation. Some examples are AD (Acción 
Democrática/Democratic Action) in Venezuela, the MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario/Revolutionary Nationalist Movement) in Bolivia, Carlos Menem’s 
Peronist Party in Argentina, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional/Institutional 
Revolutionary Party) in Mexico, and the Liberal Party in Colombia. The result of this has 
been the steady decline of the existing party structure in most countries in the region. 
Finally, the use of democratic institutions to discredit sitting Left politicians is 
also a favoured strategy, thereby creating conditions of crisis which can favour the 
removal of a Left leader. Here Right-politicians which dominate such institutions 
blame institutional crises on Left leaders, rather than on the very institutions which the 
former dominate. In tandem elites use their considerable structural and instrumental 
power, particularly in the media, to amplify such charges. An emblematic example was 
the removal through impeachment proceedings of Dilma Rousseff in 2016, which is 
explored in more detail below. 
2. Mobilisational Strategies
Mobilisational strategies involve a variety of activities beyond institutionalised, 
party based politics which nevertheless aim to install opposition parties and 
presidents in institutionalised power. Instances of such strategic manoeuvres 
against Left governments have been experienced in a wide variety of countries in 
the region, including Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Venezuela. In Argentina, the so-
called paro agrario in 2008 was a particularly tense moment for the government of 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Beginning in March that year, agricultural producers 
revolted against a new tax on exports of agricultural produce being introduced by the 
government, with regular demonstrations and supply shortages. It quickly escalated 
into one of the greatest challenges against her government from the Right, leading 
eventually to the latter’s triumph, led by Mauricio Macri, in the 2015 elections. Similar 
tactics, including violence, took place in the rich, gas producing eastern provinces 
of Bolivia between 2006-2009, aimed here at secession, and at destabilisation of the 
Left government of Evo Morales. Finally, in Venezuela student-led demonstrations 
continued throughout the latter-part of the Chávez presidency (1999-2013) and 
right up into the subsequent administration led by Nicolás Maduro (2013-). These 
tactic were also used against President Dilma Rousseff in Brazil (see below). In most of 
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these cases we can see evidence of an activation of oligarchical power in many of the 
networks identified here, including economic, ideological and transnational. 
Key features of these mobilisational strategies are, first, that they are led by elites 
as opposed to poorer groups, although the latter may become involved. Second, a 
wide variety of activity is used, from mass demonstrations, to more direct actions such 
as road blockades, production strikes etc. Third, they are almost always accompanied 
by comprehensive private media campaigns in support of the demonstrators. Fourth, 
in Bolivia and Venezuela in particular, US support, moral, strategic and financial was 
provided. Fifth, in almost all cases the ultimate aim was the removal of the government, 
except in Bolivia where the aim was secessionist, which if it had succeeded would have 
resulted in destabilisation of the government. It is important to note nevertheless, that 
these strategies did not result in the abandonment of electoral strategies and other 
institutional strategies, but rather accompanied them. 
3. Semi- or Extra-Constitutional Strategies
The cases of Venezuela (2002), Honduras (2009), Paraguay (2012) and Brazil (2016), 
with a further possible but disputed case in Ecuador (2010), demonstrate clearly that 
coups, be they with or without military involvement, are possible in the current context, 
and as the Honduran (see Cannon and Hume, 2012), Paraguayan (see Lambert, 2012) 
and Brazilian (see below) cases illustrate, can succeed if national and international 
contextual circumstances are right. Most of these examples share a number of key 
characteristics. First, they build on previous institutional and mobilisational strategies, 
providing a multi-layered, dynamic, relational, and varied strategic approach. These 
involved demonstrations of some sort (with the exception of Paraguay); media 
campaigns in all cases against the sitting Left president; US and allied government 
support (again with the partial exception of Paraguay, at least with regard to the US) 
with mostly solid regional rejection of the coup; attempts at providing a veneer of 
institutionality to the removal of the government (except Ecuador and with the most 
successful example being Paraguay and Brazil); and, the direct involvement of all or 
some elements of the Armed Forces (with the exception of Brazil and partial exception 
of Paraguay). 
Second, in all cases the aim was to reverse or stall any modifications to the 
economy and institutionality effected by the sitting Left government, that is a return to 
threatened models of elite-dominated polyarchy and market freedoms. Third, in each 
case almost all the power networks were involved: economic interests, often landed; 
ideological, especially the media; political, not just opposition political parties, but also 
state institutions; military, even in the case of Paraguay, although not so overtly; and 
transnational, most notably the United States, but also conservative governments in 
other parts of the West, such as Canada, Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
These cases then are multi-layered strategies, involving sub-state, state, regional and 
41v.5, n.1, p.29-49, 2017
Coups, “smart coups” and elections
supra-national agents, working in close cooperation to achieve a mutually agreed 
goal – the removal of an elected, Left leader. 
4. Brazil: A Case Study
A good example of all three of these strategies being put into action, is that of 
the eventual ousting of Brazil’s PT President Dilma Rousseff in August, 2016. As noted 
previously Brazil under the Workers’ Party stalled privatisation and increased state 
intervention in the economy, especially under Rousseff’s first presidential term (2010-
15). Brazil also led efforts to increase Latin American, particularly South American, 
autonomy from US dominated regional fora, most notably through UNASUR, and 
forged an independent foreign policy, with its involvement in the BRICS, its support of 
Venezuela and its relations with Iran among other features. In this way Brazil presented 
a low- to medium-level threat to the neoliberal project. Furthermore, it was a very 
successful threat, with high levels of economic growth for most of the PT period, and a 
dramatic lowering of poverty and even inequality. 
Yet the recession beginning in 2013 presented an opportunity for Right elites to 
restore their total dominance of the State, using the considerable structural power 
available to it both inside and outside Brazil’s institutions. This process began over 
a two-month period in June-July, 2013, on the eve of the Confederations Cup, with 
the country seeing the largest popular mobilisations since its return to democracy in 
1985. Started by a small, left grouping protesting modestly against public transport 
fare rises in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, these rapidly escalated into mass events, 
encompassing a whole range of issues and groups and drawing crowds of a million or 
more in the grand avenues of Sao Paulo. Initially the demonstrations were dismissed 
by right politicians and the right-wing corporatist media, with Gerardo Alckmin, 
right-wing PSDB governor of Sao Paulo state, branding demonstrators “vandals” and 
“troublemakers”, and right-wing journalists labelling them “terrorists” (Conde and 
Jazeel, 2013: 441). 
Yet this attitude changed dramatically as military police brutally attacked 
demonstrators, injuring a number of journalists in the process, and the right-wing 
media sensed a perfect opportunity to attack the PT-led federal government (Conde 
and Jazeel, 2013: 442; Sader, 2013; Saad-Filho, 2013: 659).  From thence on they offered 
blanket coverage of the protests, emptying these of their radical content and framing 
them as against the more generic “state inefficiency and corruption” (Saad-Filho, 2013: 
659). Participation in the marches exploded, with some marches in July reaching over 
one million people (ibid.). According to Winters and Witz-Shapiro (2014: 138) by this 
stage all Brazil was aware of the marches, with only 3 per cent in polls NOT having 
heard of them. 
Moreover, the themes of the original marches became subsumed in a cacophony 
of demands, from same-sex marriage to the return of the military government. Most 
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marchers were young and middle class, organising through social media, although 
local community groups and workers were often integrated into the multitude, these 
pursuing their own demands (Saad-Filho, 2013: 660).  Demonstrators rejected party 
politics in general but particularly the PT-led administrations of “Lula” da Silva and 
Dilma Rousseff. This rejection of the PT and the directionless, leaderless nature of the 
demonstrations allowed the Right to co-opt and manipulate the demonstrations “in 
order to assert their own agenda” (Conde and Jazeel, 2013: 443). This consisted primarily 
of undermining and delegitimising the Rousseff administration while promoting the 
“neoliberal globalising project” (Saad-Filho, 2013: 662). 
Indeed, the media and business elites saw this latest mobilisation as an opportunity 
to remove the PT from power altogether in the upcoming elections in 2014. With the 
economy in decline, the demonstrations helped push President Dilma Rousseff’s 
approval ratings in polls down from a high of 80 per cent before March 2013 (ibid.) 
to 30 per cent in mid-July of the same year (ibid.: 663). The government did attempt 
to win back the initiative: fare increases were rescinded, a new participative Public 
Transport Council was promised, and more money was pledged for public transport 
and for health (Conde and Jazeel, 2013: 445).  Moreover, new laws against corruption 
were introduced and the government proposed a referendum on political reform. Yet 
of these initiatives, most were stopped in their tracks by the existing institutionality, 
itself a product of the elite-led transition to democracy, with its still firm imprint of the 
military dictatorship. Congress rejected the referendum proposal as “unfeasible” while 
cuts were announced for education and health (ibid.).
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Ideological colonisation of emerging parties can also be observed in the Brazilian 
cases. In the 2014 elections, for example, there was a rush on the part of elites to 
endorse Socialist Party candidate Marina Silva in her challenge to Rousseff. Silva 
enjoyed considerable support among Brazil’s highly oligopolized private media, and 
each time she surged in the polls, corresponding surges were felt in the Brazilian stock 
exchange, suggesting endorsement from the country’s financial and business elite, 
despite her strong background in environmental politics (Grandin, 2014). Once Silva 
lost in the first round, however, elites support swiftly moved to Aécio Neves, the PSDB 
challenger. 
 The Right’s gamble almost paid off in the elections, with Rousseff barely winning 
against Neves by a mere 3,28 per cent of the vote and the PT losing seats in Congress. 
This, however, emboldened the same sectors to organise more demonstrations in 
2015 with similar demands attended by a similar demographic, in which calls for 
Rousseff’s impeachment began to be heard and even for the return of the military 
government (Jimenez-Barca, 2016).  Instrumental in the genesis of these protests 
were the corruption scandals involving the giant, mostly state-owned oil company 
Petrobras, providing kickbacks to politicians in return for favours, brought to light by a 
judicial enquiry known as Lavajato. While the media and elites project these scandals 
as being entirely the responsibility of Rousseff, despite her not having been accused 
of any crime, many of the accused are from the Right, including the Speakers of the 
Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha, and the Senate, Renan Calheiros, both from 
the PMDB; the chief opposition leader, and Rousseff’s presidential challenger in the 
2014 elections, Aécio Neves, of the PSDB; and, Michel Temer, the then vice-president 
also of the PMDB (Saad-Filho, 2015). Of these only Cunha has lost his position, after 
having served his purpose as the spearhead of the process which led to Rousseff’s 
impeachment.  
Temer, of course, ultimately replaced Dilma Rousseff as president on 31 August, 
2016, despite the accusations of corruption against him, in a process similar to a “smart 
coup” as previously executed in Paraguay against President Lugo in 2012. After a 
tortuous and highly questioned impeachment process the Senate convicted Rousseff 
of using the pedalada, a commonly used accounting technique to temporarily reduce 
the deficit, despite a Senate committee previously declaring that this was not an 
impeachable offence (See Declerq, 2016 and Watts, 2016). While some suggested that 
this act was in order to stall the Lavajato process (see Miranda, 2016), it also became 
clear that a key objective was not just to restore neoliberalism but to embed it more 
deeply in Brazil’s governance structures. Hence not only did Temer, on assuming the 
presidency, immediately announce standard neoliberal policies such as a firesale 
privatisation of state assets, including possibly parts of Petrobras, the State-owned oil 
giant (Robinson, 2016) and areas of the defence industry (Adghirni, 2016), as well as 
cuts in public spending on social programmes, and increased autonomy for the Central 
Bank (Leahy and Pearson, 2016), he also introduced a new law to set constitutional limits 
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on spending for the next twenty years (Robinson, 2016). This law will institutionalise 
austerity for the foreseeable future, eliminate the minimum allocation for education 
and health, reducing access for the poor to these social goods, and tie the hands of 
any future government to increase social spending. In this way neoliberalism becomes 
imbricated in the Brazilian state structure more deeply, making it even more of a right-
oriented state/society complex than ever before. 
Hence in Brazil we can observe a good example of a combined, multi-layered 
elite-Right strategy, using electoral, mobilisational and semi-constitutional tactics to 
remove a sitting Left leader. Right elite forces did not abandon electoral institutional 
politics; indeed, these were used to the full in attempts to remove Rousseff. However, 
mobilisation tactics were also used, with the mainstream media and business sectors 
playing a central role in promoting mass demonstrations aimed ultimately at her 
removal, despite her “extraordinary moderation” (Saad-Filho, 2013: 662). Furthermore, 
this move was reinforced by a conservative institutionality, with little sympathy for 
closer popular participation in decision-making processes. This capitalised on popular 
discontent whipped up by the conservative media, engineering an impeachment 
process against Rousseff, which while regarding constitutional form, rested on a 
charge which was recognised even by a Senate committee as a legally dubious basis 
for impeachment proceedings. On this basis alone it can be considered an example 
of a ‘smart coup’, but one which nonetheless would not have been possible without 
executing the other levels of strategy identified here. 
This removal was made possible, I would argue, for two reasons. First, it was due 
to the perception of threat felt by these elites to the continued presence of a PT-led 
administration, which despite tacking to the right during the first year of Rousseff’s 
second term was nonetheless unpredictable and reluctant to deepen the neoliberal 
project. The second reason it was possible was due to a highly vulnerable polity in 
Brazil, as identified by Mares (2014: 94-95), with a high preference to non-democratic 
solutions to problems, a low assessment of the sitting government and a high 
regard for the military.  Hence the combination of a united elite against the Rousseff 
government alongside a weak polity made the ‘smart coup’ against Rousseff possible 
and perhaps inevitable. 
Conclusion: A New Right for a New Millennium?
To sum up, in this article I argue the following with regard to the Right in Latin 
America. First, the Right in the region is shaped and controlled by the sources of 
social power to an extraordinary degree. These sources of social power – economic, 
ideological, political, military and transnational – are in the present conjuncture, 
dominated by neoliberalism, both at a discursive and at a policy level, reducing space 
for alternative policy constellations to emerge. The main aim of this new regional Right 
is to install at a national and transnational level, systems of neoliberal governance 
45v.5, n.1, p.29-49, 2017
Coups, “smart coups” and elections
which cannot be unravelled by possible Left alternatives without great difficulty, if at 
all. Such systems of neoliberal governance I have termed right-oriented state/society 
complexes due to their totalising nature across the power spectrum. 
Nevertheless, the “pink tide” governments which emerged since the millennium, 
particularly those grouped under the Bolivarian label, organised transnationally into 
the ALBA grouping, have reversed elite social power in many of these power networks 
to a sufficient degree to alarm elites, suggesting a direct link between Right strategies 
and the intensity of change to the neoliberal model effected by Left governments in 
the region.  Here I suggest, that the higher the level of such change, the higher the 
level of threat felt by elites to the neoliberal model, with the opposite also being true. 
Right counter-acting strategies can vary in intensity and widen in terms of 
actors and activity in response to the level of perceived threat. I identify three levels 
of strategy: institutional, mobilisational, and extra-constitutional. In the first, this is 
largely contained within existing institutionality in the form of party and electoral 
activity, and the use of state institutions for partisan goals; in the second, this can be 
complemented by popular demonstrations, investor strikes, media campaigns and 
a wide variety of mobilisational activities beyond the political power network and 
into all other networks including the transnational; and, in the third, semi- or extra-
constitutional level strategic activity can be further extended to include the removal 
of the government, including with Armed Forces involvement (extra-constitutional) 
but preferably in such a way as to ensure a smooth transition to a new Right-oriented 
government, in what I have called “smart coups” or semi-constitutional removals. 
I further argue that these strategies are not exclusive but can be complementary, 
emerging from the particular conjunctural dynamic. 
Moreover, I tentatively suggest that the success of these strategies can be 
directly linked not just to the perception of threat felt by elites but also by the level of 
vulnerability of the democratic polity existing in a specific state. The higher the level of 
threat felt by elites and the higher the vulnerability of the polity, the more likely coups 
will occur, and even be successful. Overall, I suggest that this theoretical approach 
is more complete than previous, more traditional, political science approaches, as it 
provides greater flexibility across time and space and greater comprehensiveness in 
its inclusion of a wider number of actors in a more systematised fashion. I offer the 
recent removal of the PT administration led by Dilma Rousseff as a case study of such 
strategies being used successfully. 
Grugel and Riggirozzi (2012), Wylde (2012) and others have argued that post-
neoliberal forms of governance have emerged – tentative and experimental – which 
have sought to challenge neoliberal governance and reassert the role of the state 
in reinforcing popular citizenship, both in the economic and at the political levels. 
I suggest here that the Right has risen to defeat this challenge by seeking the return 
of neoliberal systems of governance, but this time made more secure through 
actual or mooted insertion into dense regional (PA) transnational (FTAs, OECD) and 
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inter-continental governance structures (TISA and TTIP), to ensure that such 
challenges, if they emerge again, are thoroughly neutered from the outset. We can 
see evidence of this in the rapid implementation of neoliberal measures by the newly 
installed Macri administration in Argentina (Kozameh, 2016; Adair, 2016) and by the 
“interim government” of Michel Temer in Brazil (Ituassa and Badia i Dalmases,2016; 
Rocha, 2016). Right strategies then are multi-scalar in their approach involving non-
state, state, regional and transnational actors to achieve neoliberalised governance 
structure which are dominated by these same actors. 
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